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ABSTRACT
Understood as one among a number of world regions, North America is an enig-
ma displaying many diverse realities. Seen in its formal institutionalization by the
North American Free Trade Agreement, it is considerably less than meets the eye.
When examined in such governance spheres as transborder water management or
the steel industry, it turns out to have considerably more substance than first
meets the eye. In other cases, such as the regulation of financial services or intel-
lectual property rights, what appears as continental policy harmonization is really
a manifestation of globalization. In contrast, anti-terrorist border-security mea-
sures are just what they seem: U.S.-driven inter-governmental policy coordination
in which the hegemon ends up depending on the periphery’s collaboration. As for
determining where North America is heading, global market consolidation in the
steel industry suggests that the continent has lost its chance to become a regional
regulatory space. The 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
may have affirmed the three federal governments’ desire to reconcile the U.S. pri-
ority for border security with the periphery’s need for prosperity, but did not give
any sign that North America was an embryonic EU about to develop along the lines
of the European model.
Key words: North American governance, NAFTA, U.S. hegemony, Canada-U.S. relations,
Mexico-U.S. relations, world regions, Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
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INTRODUCTION
The idea that North America is a key regulatory regime has garnered some aca-
demic support. In 2006, for example, Julián Castro Rea wrote that “in January 1994,
North America formally entered the club of world regions, launching the project of
an integrated economic space” (Castro Rea, 2006). In addition, in a piece reflecting
on North America’s progress since the signing of NAFTA, Robert Pastor made a sim-
ilar observation about this continent’s nature, affirming that “[f]or the first time,
‘North America’ is more than just a geographical expression” or “merely the first
draft of an economic constitution for North America” (Pastor, 2004: 124-5). While it
is intellectually tempting to see North America as an embryonic European Union,
we must first closely evaluate the current state of transborder governance. Can we
really say that North America is more than a landmass? If so, is the governance that
characterizes it enough to state that it has joined a global club of regions?1
Depicting the continent dominated economically, demographically, culturally,
and geopolitically by the United States of America as part of a global phenomenon
is intellectually intriguing, because it connects scholarship on North America with
the rich vein of academic research that understands globalization as a dual move-
ment. On the one hand, it is a primarily economic and technological phenomenon
in which corporations have largely escaped the regulatory reach of nation-states as
they expand their production and distribution to a regional scale. On the other hand,
these states, which used to compete with their neighbors, are responding to global-
ization’s challenge by forming regional groupings to vie at the global scale with other
regional economies. In this understanding, the evolution of the European Com-
munity into the European Union (EU) during the second half of the twentieth centu-
ry is often presented as the prototype of the new “world region.” In the terminology
of the regulation school, the political economy of this phenomenon is understood
as a regional regime of capital accumulation being managed by a regional mode of
policy regulation (Aglietta, 1979).2 Placing North America in this framework is
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tempting, because it is similar to the EU in culture (whether measured by common
heritage or linked histories) and in size (whether measured by population or gross
national product).
But such exercises are academically problematic, because the very act of look-
ing at North America in the context of comparative world regions leads many to
assume that the former is an embryonic, institutionally “lite” version of the model
that evolved on the eastern shores of the Atlantic Ocean. This is a daring assumption
given its small membership (three compared to the EU’s 27 member-states); given
its stark asymmetries (the United States is not just overwhelmingly more powerful
than its neighbors to the north and south: it is the global hegemon); and given the
disparate nature of its two bilateral relationships (rich Canada has long enjoyed a
relatively easy, even cozy relationship with Washington, whereas a much poorer
Mexico has mostly had to manage a tense, extremely conflictual one with Uncle Sam).
It is well known that the processes forming the European Union constrained
the largest power, Germany, from flexing its economic muscles and empowered the
smaller members with institutions that offset their low political weight and pro-
grams that raised the poorer members to the economic level of the richer. The EU’s
complex system, which weakened the strong and strengthened the weak, derived
from an ideological consensus about the need to guarantee intergovernmental
peace based on a generous social-policy framework. However, if our interest lies in
understanding the nature of North America’s transborder governance, NAFTA did
little to create anything in its two bilateral sets of asymmetrical, market-led rela-
tionships that resemble the extraordinary model of state-led governance estab-
lished at the continental scale by the EU. 
This article argues that the apparently descriptive phrase “North America”
actually conceals two historically separate realities whose cross-border dynamic is
moving the continental model along a path that is divergent from, rather than con-
gruent with, the one offered by Europe. It makes the case by distinguishing four dif-
ferent “realities” that constitute North American governance:
• It is less than meets the eye as far as its formal trilateral institutions are con-
cerned.
• It is more then meets the eye in certain policy areas such as border-region man-
agement and some sectors like the steel industry.
• Its apparent trinational policy harmonization is not at all what meets the eye in
other economic sectors like bank regulation and the three countries’ intellec-
tual property rights regimes.
87
DOES NORTH AMERICA EXIST?
SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
• It is just what it seems when we look at the intergovernmental regulatory
transformations that have taken place at Washington’s insistence since Sep-
tember 11, 2001.
In order to answer the questions raised in the introduction about North Amer-
ica’s configuration, each section will describe a particular aspect of transborder
governance in the region, assessing whether the process has augmented or reduced
the continent’s power asymmetries and maintained or mitigated the once stark dis-
crepancy between the U.S.-Mexico and the U.S.-Canada relationships. The conclud-
ing section will take up the hazardous challenge of trying to see in what direction
continental governance is moving, whether in the market place or in its state structure.
FORMAL TRILATERAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION: 
LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE
If North America, whose characteristics this journal is attempting to describe, is
more than just a geographical expression, this is thanks to two economic agreements,
the first forged bilaterally between the United States and its northern neighbor as the
so-called Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA, which entered into
force January 1, 1989), the second known as the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), which entered into force on January 1, 1994 when CUFTA’s provisions
were deepened and extended to include Mexico. 
The proposition that NAFTA is less than meets the eye does not depend on argu-
ing that its norms, rules, and rights are inconsequential. On the contrary, these three
components of what became part of each signatory’s “external constitution”3 severely
disciplined the practices of the two peripheral states, if not those of the hegemon.
• The extension of the national treatment (NT) norm from applying to goods (as
it had under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) to including for-
eign investment required a wholesale change of Canada’s industrial-strategy
policies that had previously provided incentives to domestic corporations to
bolster their capacities to compete with foreign –mainly American– compa-
nies. Applying NT to investment also nailed shut the coffin of Mexico’s import
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substitution industrialization model, which had delivered an annual growth
rate of 6 percent from World War II to the early 1980s.
• Dozens of new rules obliged Canada, for example, to drastically raise the min-
imum size of domestic companies whose acquisition by foreign corporations
could be vetted. For its part, Mexico agreed to open up its banking sector to for-
eign participation according to detailed protocols.
• Important new rights were granted to foreign investors who could now di-
rectly sue North American host governments from the municipal to the feder-
al level for “expropriating” their wealth.
These norms, rules, and rights did not meet many eyes, because they were buried
in the reader-unfriendly pages of CUFTA’s and NAFTA’s turgid texts. It was CUFTA’s,
and then NAFTA’s much-ballyhooed institutions that provided little for the eye. To
be sure, NAFTA boasts an executive body, the North American Free Trade Com-
mission (NAFTC). But however hard one might look, this commission is nowhere to
be found, having no staff, no address, and no budget. Despite the substantial
responsibilities for managing NAFTA’s implementation conferred on it by the agree-
ment, it consists solely of sporadic meetings by the three countries’ trade ministers,
secretaries, or representatives, who have been loath to make major decisions. 
Nor does NAFTA have much in the way of an administrative arm. Buried in each
of the three governments’ trade departments, there is a small office responsible for
documenting NAFTA-related business. NAFTA’s remaining bureaucratic sinew consists
of some 30 committees and working groups mandated by the agreement’s various
chapters. These trinational groupings, which are, in theory, staffed by middle-level
civil servants from each federal government, barely exist in practice (Clarkson et al.,
2005: 168-94). As for a legislative capacity to abolish, add to, or amend NAFTA’s new
norms, rules, or rights –a necessary feature of any institution which hopes to retain
its relevance as conditions evolve– this “world region” has none. Changes require
trilateral negotiations by the three governments.
NAFTA’s only institutional feature with any substance lies in its judicial capaci-
ties. But of the half dozen different dispute settlement mechanisms, two have
remained dormant (energy and financial institutions) and two are ineffectual (those
of the environmental and labor cooperation commissions). The agreement’s two
chief conflict resolution processes are specified in Chapter 20 and Chapter 19.
Disputes between the parties over the interpretation and implementation of NAFTA’s
provisions were to be resolved by panels established under Chapter 20’s clauses,
but the panel rulings merely take the form of recommendations to the NAFTC which,
in turn, can only offer suggestions to the three governments about how to proceed.
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When, for instance, after long delays caused by U.S. obstructionist tactics, a NAFTA
panel ruled that the U.S. government had failed to honor its obligation to allow
Mexican truckers access to its market, Washington resisted compliance for years. 
Putatively binding rulings are made by panels established under Chapter 19,
which replace domestic legal appeals of the antidumping or countervailing duty
determinations made by individual states’ trade-administrative tribunals. While
useful in the majority of cases, the U.S. government’s refusal to actually comply
with these rulings in such high-profile cases as the long-drawn-out softwood lum-
ber dispute with Canada underlines the point that NAFTA’s institutions enjoy strik-
ingly little clout. 
The single arbitral function with definite muscle is the investor-state dispute
process established in Chapter 11, which allows NAFTA corporations to initiate an
arbitration process governed by World Bank rules in order to rule on the validity of
a domestic measure they claim has “expropriated” their assets. Because these rulings
must be implemented by the defendant jurisdiction, they have been the cause of
much dismay among nationalists who protest the derogation of domestic judicial
sovereignty and among environmentalists who believe the threat of such actions pre-
vents the regulation of corporate depredation. But because the number of Chapter
11 cases remains small and their effects limited, their overall institutional impor-
tance must be considered marginal.
In short, the transborder governance established by NAFTA’s institutions is con-
siderably less than observers had cause to expect when listening either to propo-
nents or opponents of what President Ronald Reagan had called North America’s
economic constitution (Clarkson and Torres-Ruiz, 2005: 1). Compared to Norway,
which even though it is not a member of the European Union must (with exceptions
in farming, fishing, and oil exportation) implement European Commission direc-
tives, NAFTA’s institutional impact even on the two peripheral states is low, except
in cases where Washington has directly chosen to apply pressure.
Institutionally speaking, NAFTA does not create a trilateral space. Nevertheless,
its norms, rules, and rights make the regulatory space in the two peripheral states
more similar to that of the hegemon with the result that transnational corporations
(TNCs) can operate more easily as continentally structured production and marketing
entities in the three economies. Given that NAFTA’s norms, rules, and rights were large-
ly defined by the United States in defense of its interests in the periphery, they can
be seen to have augmented U.S. hegemonic power in the continent. Because Mexico
had to make the largest changes to its political order (for instance, inserting an
entire trade-remedy arbitral system under Chapter 19), NAFTA can be seen to have
reduced the skewedness between the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico relationships. 
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TRANSBORDER GOVERNANCE: MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE
Although NAFTA created a new North America that could be analyzed as a “world
region,” the old North America had long enjoyed –or suffered from– forms of gov-
ernance that were often much more than met the eye, because their institutional-
ization was either informal or largely invisible. Out of many possible cases, this
section will consider one, water management, which pre-dated NAFTA by a century,
and another, the steel industry, for which NAFTA had unanticipated consequences.
WATER
Some forms of North American transborder governance developed through pro-
cesses that took place in a zone of decision-making and consultation that transcend-
ed the international boundaries. From the nineteenth century on, concerns about
the exploitation and oversight of North America’s transboundary water resources
gave rise to several treaties and corresponding binational institutions established to
manage the flow, level, and quality of water in the lakes and rivers bisected by the
U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican borders. While the International Joint Commission
(IJC), set up in 1909 thanks to that year’s Boundary Water Treaty, is well known, the
actual management –often mismanagement– of water matters on both borders is
carried out by hundreds of collaborative arrangements involving agencies, busi-
ness corporations, scientists, and environmentalist groups concerned about their
local or regional ecosystems.
The legal basis for cooperative governance of the Tijuana River Basin is the
1944 United States-Mexico Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Col-
orado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande. The 1944 treaty substantially
expanded the powers and changed the name of the existing boundary institution
from the International Boundary Commission to the International Boundary Water
Commission composed of two national sections, of which the Mexican section is
called the International Boundaries and Water Commission (CILA). The roles and res-
ponsibilities of the CILA and the IJC are quite different due to the hydrological and
socio-economic features of the respective border regions, the southern suffering from
much greater water scarcity than the northern and Mexican border infrastructure
being so much poorer than Canadian. 
North America’s water governance is a vast and multi-layered regime of na-
tional and international institutions, legal frameworks, and interacting social and
economic values which, according to circumstance, converge and diverge in an
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irregular and unpredictable fashion (Buie, 2005). Given the high levels of social and
economic integration in the zones along the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders,
the management of water resources presents a highly complex dynamic between
different levels of government and public participation in political processes, which
are not necessarily evolving in the direction of transborder integration.
Guided by the George W. Bush administration’s hostility to international law,
the U.S. government has been resisting recognition of the International Joint Com-
mission’s mandate for supervision over such major problems as the ecosystem-
threatening diversion of Devil’s Lake into the Red River watershed and the withdrawal
of Great Lakes’ water through Illinois. Although water management in the U.S.-
Mexico border region is developing patterns of cooperation among non-governmen-
tal organizations that belie the highly visible political conflicts over undocumented
Mexican immigrants, transborder North American water governance remains sep-
arated into two bilateral spaces. Although their hydraulic geography is so different
and their economic character is so disparate, increased environmental pressures
caused by the maquila industrialization in northern Mexican states has caused bor-
der governance patterns to resemble those along the Canadian border because of
cross-border involvement of government, market, and civil society at various levels.
At the same time, water governance reduces the power asymmetry between hege-
mon and periphery, because the former depends on the latter to implement agree-
ments once they have been negotiated.
STEEL
With NAFTA’s explicit aim to enhance continental economic integration, we should
find evidence of continental governance in the marketplace. Beyond the powerful
intervention of corporate actors in lobbying during the negotiation of the free-
trade agreements (Lachapelle, 2005), a few economic sectors provide evidence
of governance with a continent-wide substance. Steel provides a fascinating case
in point.
In spite of the fact that, as traditional heavy industry, steel provided the backbone
of the old manufacturing economy, it did not do well under NAFTA. The agreement
failed to eliminate the protectionist anti-dumping, safeguard, and countervailing-
duty measures with which the U.S. steel industry had long been harassing the
exports of their more efficient competitors from the North. When, in their frustration,
the Canadian firms invested heavily in the United States, they produced a phe-
nomenon similar to the “Toyotafication” created when U.S. restrictions on Japanese
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car imports caused firms such as Toyota and Honda to set up manufacturing oper-
ations within the United States. 
But instead of retaining their own identity and lobbying as Canadian firms for
their national sector’s interests, the American subsidiaries of Canadian companies
became active as U.S. members of industry associations like the American Iron and
Steel Institute (AISI). As AISI players in good standing within the U.S. economy, they
proceeded to lobby –along with the U.S. steelworkers’ union, which had fortu-
itously been run for a decade by Canadian presidents– to exempt Canada (and also
Mexico) from the Bush administration’s safeguard duties imposed on foreign steel
imports. This collaborative action suggested that, in the steel sector, a single gover-
nance space was developing in which Canadian, and later Mexican, firms have par-
tially “Americanized” themselves within the U.S. economy, rather than create a
continent-wide industry containing nationally competitive elements. 
Symptomatic of this trilateralism is the creation of an instrument of trinational
governance, the North American Steel Trade Committee (NASTC). The NASTC involves
the three governments with their respective industry associations in order to develop
common North American policy positions at the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization. Although the
steel sector in North America became more of a unilateral space in which U.S. hege-
monic control increased –witness the peripheral states’ inability to overcome the
U.S. Congress’s protectionist mandate– the skewed quality of the two bilateral rela-
tionships also increased. The Canadian industry was much better positioned to par-
ticipate in the U.S. economy than was its Mexican counterpart, which, having
flourished under import substitution industrialization, was seriously weakened by
the lifting of government protection in the 1980s. 
TRINATIONAL POLICY HARMONIZATION: 
NOT AT ALL WHAT MEETS THE EYE
Although the North American steel industry showed distinct “world-region” signs,
other economic sectors where harmonization has increased are not necessarily evi-
dence of continentalization. Take for instance the regulation of two sectors: intellec-
tual property rights for the pharmaceutical industry and rules for financial services.
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS
Because NAFTA was negotiated just before GATT’s Uruguay Round reached its suc-
cessful conclusion, the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995 presents
many analytical complications for students of North American governance. The
question of intellectual property rights (IPRs) provides an illuminating example, be-
cause the United States has aggressively insisted that its position on intellectual
property rights be accepted as a condition for its trade relations with its interlocutors.
The strengthening of IPRs for branded drugs also has been driven by European
pharmaceutical TNCs. They have been battling against domestic legislation protect-
ing the production of cheaper generic drugs in every country so that Big Pharma
could obtain longer periods of monopoly protection and extract greater income from
its brands. In this process, then-Prime Minister Brian Mulroney did not wait for the
trade negotiations to redefine IPRs, but pre-emptively adjusted Canada’s laws, which
had favored the generic firms, in order to comply with U.S. demands (Lexchin, 2003).
Subsequently, the United States and the EU had their positions favoring longer
patent protection for branded drugs accepted at the WTO. This forced Mexico to fol-
low suit and adopt the new global rules as well. 
Even if the IPRs in NAFTA’s Chapter 17 are virtually identical to those in the
WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, the
fact that Washington used the WTO’s dispute-settlement body, rather than NAFTA’s,
as its legal venue for pressing Canada to make more concessions to U.S.-branded drug
companies suggests that weak continental judicial governance has been trumped
by the stronger judicial governance established at the global level. For their part, the
EU’s pharmaceutical firms have used the WTO’s dispute settlement process to force
Canada and Mexico to provide longer protection than they had been willing to con-
cede. This case shows how global governance has displaced continental governance. 
While the transborder governance for the pharmaceutical industry is different
from what we would expect if North America were a genuinely trilateral space, the
power implications in this sector are similar to changes in other sectors. New IPRs
increase “hegemonification” through the expanded agency of U.S. pharmaceutical
TNCs in the two peripheral economies. At the same time, the transformation of
Mexico’s property rights regime tends to eliminate its discrepancy with that of
Canada and so reduces the skewed quality of the U.S.-Canada and U.S. Mexico
relationship.
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FINANCIAL SERVICES
Banking offers a confused picture, because North America is not a natural zone for
transnational banking. Some Canadian banks have operated for decades through-
out the hemisphere and to a lesser extent globally, while all of them already had
branches in the U.S. market well before trade liberalization. For their part, U.S.
banks had also set up shop in Canada long before free trade. Notwithstanding their
geographical proximity, it was not U.S. but British banks that predominated among
foreign-owned financial services in Canada whose retail banking system remains
primarily in Canadian hands. With a much less robust set of banks, nationalized in
1982 following one of the country’s periodic currency crises, Mexico has found itself
at the receiving end of transnationalized banking. NAFTA had required it to open spec-
ified portions of its re-privatized banks to foreign ownership according to a defined
schedule, but in the shock of the 1995 peso crisis, the IMF, World Bank, and the U.S.
Treasury used their financial bailout to force Mexico to go all the way. After a bliz-
zard of foreign banks merging and associating themselves with domestic partners,
Mexicans found that all but one of their banks had fallen under foreign ownership,
with Spanish capital taking a larger share than American.
Although harmonization of the three banking sectors’ regulations has occurred
within North America, this is not due to any transborder governance created by
NAFTA. Rather, this apparent continentalization actually reflects the three countries’
participation in the larger process of global governance. If banking regulations in
the United States, Mexico, and Canada are becoming increasingly similar to each other,
this is because the three central banks’ participate in the monthly meetings of the
Bank of International Settlements in Basel. It is the multilaterally agreed norms that
are negotiated in Switzerland that are then applied at home. Instead of banking reg-
ulations showing that North America is a “world region,” they indicate that the
three countries of North America are simply part of a global mode of regulation for
a global system of accumulation.
Because these norms are negotiated in an international forum where U.S. power
is offset by that of Europe and Asia, the effect in North America is to reduce U.S.
hegemonic control over the periphery in financial services. Similarly, because bank-
ing regulations are tending to harmonize, the regulatory discrepancy between the
Canadian and Mexican banking has declined. The implications of this regulatory
reality is that North America’s banking space is less trilateral, bilateral, or unilater-
al than it is global. 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SECURITY REGULATION: 
JUST WHAT IT SEEMS
The radical shift in the United States, provoked by the terrorist attacks in New York
and Washington, instantly affected the overall nature of North American gover-
nance. The economic integration fostered by NAFTA had been reducing the govern-
ment-made economic barriers along the United States’ two territorial borders in
order to allow the marketplace a freer rein to enhance human and economic flows
across the continent. Throughout the 1990s, the growth in cross-border traffic in
goods and people had generated increased attention to border governance issues,
as business coalitions, concerned about the efficiency of their continent-wide pro-
duction systems, lobbied their respective governments to make the increased in-
vestments in the transportation infrastructure and security technology needed to
create a near-borderless continent. President Clinton had signed agreements with
Ottawa to improve border security management, but his administration had not
taken significant actions in this direction. 9/11 led to intergovernmental shifts both
in security and in defence.
SECURITY
Washington’s sudden move to a security paradigm was dramatized for North
America on September 11 by its immediate blockade of its two land borders. This
unilateral action demonstrated that, once Washington declared its national security
to be at stake, it would simply reassert its control over the policy space it had pre-
viously vacated in the name of trade liberalization. Its subsequent demands that
Canada and Mexico do what it felt was necessary to make their exports safe for the
United States showed how much of North American governance was unilaterally
driven by Uncle Sam. 
In the post-September-11 handling of U.S. domestic security, traditional bina-
tional relations reasserted themselves over unilateralism, Uncle Sam dealing with
each periphery on its own. These intergovernmental negotiations were supplement-
ed on the Canadian side by unusually active business-coalition involvement in the
design of new security systems, a new intensity of governance impinging on the tra-
ditional, government-to-government bilateralism. In this first phase of the U.S. do-
mestic war on terror, a detailed, 30-point U.S.-Canada Smart Border agreement was
signed in Ottawa in December 2001. By March 2002, Washington had negotiated a
parallel 22 -point Smart Border agreement with Mexico City. 
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That this process was driven by U.S. pressure on its neighbors suggests that the
result was to increase U.S. control over Mexico and Canada. But, because Washing-
ton depended on Ottawa and Mexico City to implement the measures that had
been agreed upon, the United States depended on its two neighbours for its securi-
ty. Hence, the power asymmetry between the center and its periphery diminished. 
The fact that the U.S.-Canada border agreement had provided Washington
with a template for its arrangement with Mexico also suggests that this process
diminished the disparity between Ottawa’s relationship with Washington and
Mexico City’s. Although drug-trafficking and immigration problems were far more
intense along its southern than its northern border, Congress pushed the adminis-
tration to adopt common policies towards biometric identity cards for all persons
crossing U.S. borders. For its part, the administration’s support for universal tech-
nological solutions to passing low-risk merchandise across the border and through
its ports of entry further reduced the disparity between the two countries’ responses
to Washington. And when Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff broke
off talks to establish a pilot project on land pre-clearance at the Buffalo-Fort Erie
crossing in May 2007 after two years of negotiations, it was clear that the U.S. gov-
ernment’s obsession with security could hamstring commerce on its northern bor-
der just as much as along its southern one.
The new dynamics of continental security also helped nourish the third North
American bilateral relationship that had developed between Mexico and Canada
since Canada had joined the U.S.-Mexico negotiations which led to NAFTA. This
third bilateral relationship was given a major boost during the anxious months
leading up to President Bush’s declaration of war against Iraq, when Jean Chrétien
developed an oppositional axis with Vicente Fox in an effort to block the impend-
ing invasion by generating a new consensus at the United Nations. 
DEFENSE
In contrast, an absence of Canadian-Mexican dialogue characterized each country’s
response to Northern Command, the Pentagon’s reorganization of its command struc-
ture for North American defense. In responding to Northern Command, Ottawa
had to decide how far it would follow the Norad model of actually integrating its
armed forces while retaining nominal autonomy. In an apparent move toward com-
plete integration, it reorganized its armed forces into a Canada Command but did
not move beyond participating in a binational military planning group whose man-
date was to discuss extending bilateral military integration from the two air forces
to their army and navy. Nor did the Chrétien government resolve how to respond to
the United States’ pressure to support its Ballistic Missile Defense program, whose
technological integrity was suspect and whose strategic rationale violated Canada’s
well-established stance against the “weaponization” of space. In the end, partisan
political calculations in 2005 forced Prime Minister Paul Martin to refuse Canada’s
endorsement for BMD, while ideological proclivity to support the United States sub-
sequently pushed Prime Minister Stephen Harper in the opposite direction.
Just as Canada reverted to its Cold War intimacy with the Pentagon upon the
declaration of the new U.S. global war, Mexico reverted to its Cold War estrange-
ment. Far from ingratiating itself with Washington by sending support to Afghan-
istan, Mexico withheld even moral support and reaffirmed its long tradition of
non-intervention beyond its frontiers. Although the Mexican navy was comfortable
about cooperating with the U.S. Navy on security exercises in the Gulf of Mexico,
there was no possibility that the Mexican military could be prevailed upon to col-
laborate with the U.S. Army beyond the kind of disaster relief that it supplied in
2005 in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (Alvarez, 2005). While sending a Mexican
military observer to bilateral U.S.-Canadian meetings at Norad was seen to be a
major step forward, the significance attributed to this gesture underlined the enor-
mous discrepancy that persisted between the two bilateral relationships in North
America’s defense sector.
THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP: AN ENIGMA
Following the argument so far, the reader will have seen that, as a “world region,”
the North America created by NAFTA does not add up to much in institutional terms.
While border-region water management and the continental steel industry provide
examples of significant transborder governance, other domains such as intellectual
property rights and financial services show that what appears to be regulatory har-
monization is often a manifestation of the United States, Canada, and Mexico par-
ticipating in global governance. A third North American reality, which has become
particularly evident since Washington declared its global war on terrorism, is made
up of the largely bilateral intergovernmental U.S.-led relations focusing on border
security and regional defense. The difficulty in aggregating these diverse realities
into an overall portrait of the continent is exacerbated by our desire to divine in
which direction it is moving. Is North America becoming a more trilateral space as
opposed to remaining primarily bilateral? Or is it –deep down– increasingly
defined by U.S. unilateralism? This concluding section will extrapolate from trends
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observable in 2006 concerning both North America’s inter-state relations and its
marketplace.
TOWARD A CONTINENTAL STATE?
If the first securitization phase following September 2001 showed North America
as a more bilateral and hegemonized –while more symmetrical– space, the procla-
mation of a Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America (SPP) by the three
governments’ leaders following their trinational summit in March 2005 in Waco,
Texas, appeared to herald a shift to a more trilateral continent. Nationalist critics in
the periphery feared SPP was a maneuver through which the executives in Canada
and Mexico were advancing their agenda stealthily to integrate their political sys-
tems with the hegemon’s. Corporate leaders in the three countries, who aspire to
operate in a borderless North America, criticized SPP as a mere wish list of low-pro-
file bureaucratic initiatives whose implementation will do nothing to engage with
such major challenges facing the continent as a common currency, a customs union,
a security perimeter, or even a fully integrated energy market.
The original breakthrough which led to the SPP apparently occurred in 2003 in
the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), where reason (the practical need to im-
prove security for a United States economically integrated with its two neighbors)
prevailed over passion (anger with Canada and Mexico for not supporting the U.S.
war against Iraq).4 The project’s long gestation in the three capitals, necessitated, in
part, by waiting for the 2004 U.S. presidential election results, was followed by three
intensive months of trilateral inter-bureaucratic exchanges that produced, for a mi-
nisterial meeting in Ottawa in June 2005, a large trilingual document outlining some
300 specific issue areas to be negotiated and implemented by government officials
within clearly defined time lines.
As seen from the Mexican presidency (Los Pinos), the Americans’ security imper-
ative needed to be accepted as the paradigm within which the continental periphery
had to operate. Since the NSC was acknowledging that tightened U.S. anti-terrorist
border security should not jeopardize U.S. economic prosperity, SPP presented Mex-
ico with an opportunity to resolve many irritating problems in the bilateral economic
relationship and so move NAFTA incrementally toward its grander vision of EU-type
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4 This section is based on several dozen confidential conversations held, inter alia, in the Mexican Presi-
dency and Ministries of Agriculture, Economy, and Foreign Affairs; in the U.S. Department of Commerce
and National Security Council in Washington, D.C.; and equivalent Canadian offices in the spring of 2006,
as well as follow-up interviews in the three capitals a year later.
regional governance. The trade-off was to exchange full cooperation with U.S. de-
mands on security matters for getting inside the U.S. policy loop to negotiate the reg-
ulatory corollaries that applied to trade.
Thus, when the U.S. Congress passed a tough bio-terrorism law and outraged
Mexican legislators called for retaliatory action to block imports of U.S. goods at
their northern border, Los Pinos decided that the better part of valor was compli-
ance. Faced with the tough new U.S. requirements, President Vicente Fox’s officials
worked intensively with Mexican food exporters’ associations to help them adapt
their members’ certification and packaging to conform to Washington’s new speci-
fications. This effort climaxed in December 2005, when the bio-terrorism law came
into effect and no Mexican produce was blocked at the border for non-compliance.
If SPP negotiations could produce certification standards governing Mexican
foodstuffs, then such Mexican products as avocados would no longer be vulnerable
to unilateral rulings by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. This would give
Mexico’s agricultural exporters a vital competitive advantage over their rivals in
Latin America, Asia, and even Europe. Facilitating the documentation for transborder
flights of private aircraft was a far cry from a Big Idea for North America,5 but imple-
menting myriad incremental changes would lead implicitly toward that objective. 
The indication that SPP was a program with political legs could be deduced
from the fact that civil servants in Ottawa also claimed credit for conceptualizing
and boosting the initiative. Nurtured by research contracts and policy conferences
sponsored by the Policy Research Initiative of the federal government’s Privy Council
Office, regulatory harmonization had already become a battle cry within Paul Mar-
tin’s government. Stephen Harper’s presence at the trilateral summit in Cancún in
March 2006 to mark the first anniversary of SPP was a signal that his Conservative
government had appropriated this Liberal initiative as its own.
While the bulk of the Security and Prosperity Partnership’s proposed measures
dealt with either the U.S.-Canada or the U.S.-Mexico relationship, the informal tele-
phone and e-mail communications among the bureaucrats who had put them
together suggested that some significant trilateral space had been created in the
process. Although the security side of the SPP reaffirmed Washington’s dominance
within the continent, the prosperity issues seemed to promise some autonomy for
the periphery. “Regulatory harmonization” might conjure up images of Mexico and
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5 The “Big Idea” for an EU-style institutionalization of a borderless North America in a grand NAFTA-Plus
vision was suggested in Canada by Wendy Dobson for Toronto’s CD Howe Institute using work done for
Washington’s Institute for International Economics by Robert Pastor (Dobson, 2005). Pastor had already
sold the analysis to the Mexican political scientist Jorge Castañeda who, in turn, had persuaded Vicente
Fox to adopt a version of the scheme for his successful 2000 election campaign for the Mexican presidency.
See also D’Aquino, Rozental, and Pastor (2005).
Canada simply having to adopt U.S. standards, but the complexities and differ-
ences among each country’s multi-level governmental system implied that this
nightmare was unlikely to be realized within anyone’s lifetime. Issues would have
to be worked out pragmatically. In some cases, the U.S. officials would still be giv-
ing their Mexican counterparts the familiar “do it our way or your product will not
cross our border” message. In other cases, a practical problem would have to be
worked out by all the parties having to resolve their problems cooperatively. 
As for whether the SPP’s many small measures would lead ineluctably to the
implementation of a Big Idea, passionate resistance within the U.S. government to
creating continental institutions made this scenario unlikely. Even though the three
countries’ executives were marching in step on this initiative, which merely engages
the upper-middle ranks of their bureaucracies, the three governments pay virtually
no attention to each other’s interests when negotiating new trade agreements with
other countries and have shown little sign –apart from the one exception of develop-
ing a common position on steel policy– of moving toward a common position on inter-
national economic policy. In contrast, the crucial automobile and textile industries
are showing signs that North America is losing its potential to be a regional regime
of accumulation for which it needs a counterpart regional mode of regulation.
TOWARD A CONTINENTAL MARKETPLACE?
If NAFTA produced winners, they surely were the U.S. auto and textile sectors, which
had managed to obtain rules of origin which gave them protection –at least for the
short term– against their Asian and European competitors.
AUTOMOBILES
The culmination of many years of U.S. automotive TNCs’ lobbying, NAFTA was thought
to have set up a fully integrated system of production for those manufacturers
–principally the Detroit Three– which could meet its protectionist rules of origin
requirements. However, significant impediments remained, and the trilateral work-
ing groups created to negotiate continental safety and emissions standards proved
incapable of producing the trilateral regulatory harmonization necessary for fully
integrated continental production.
Meanwhile, transcontinental corporate consolidation through mergers and equi-
ty linkages, which had left only six automotive groups accounting for 80 percent of
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world production, was developing a truly global regime of accumulation which
was accordingly generating pressures to create a globally harmonized system of
regulation for the automotive industry. Global competition has reduced U.S. TNCs’
oligopolistic dominance in the continent. At the same time, continuing foreign auto
and auto-parts investment in both Ontario (which benefits from socializing the cost
of medical care and provides an excellent transportation system) and Mexico (which
offers well-trained labor power at a small fraction of U.S. wages) has reduced the
disparity between the two peripheries’ car economies. This continental industrial
space has become largely trilateral, even if Fortress America now presents an open
door to the world.
TEXTILES
NAFTA’s rules of origin also appeared to succeed in connecting the three countries’
disparate textile and apparel industries in a common North American production
system, in which the interests of U.S. firms combined more intimately with bur-
geoning Mexican firms than they did with shrinking Canadian companies. This initial
trilateral marriage developed greater asymmetries as NAFTA-generated continental
market governance collapsed in the face of two exogenous adversities: the expira-
tion of the Multi-Fiber Agreement, which had allowed industrialized countries to
impose draconian quantitative limitations on apparel imports from the Third World,
and China’s emergence as the dominant supplier to the North American market.
Continental governance in a severely shaken textile and apparel industry still
follows a hub-and-spoke model, with U.S. industry responding unilaterally to its
challenges, a battered Mexican industry retreating to the informal economy while
supporting Washington’s endeavors, and a hollowed-out Canadian sector sitting
on the sidelines. 
CONCLUSION
In sum, as one among a number of world regions, North America is an enigma dis-
playing many diverse realities. Seen in its formal institutionalization by NAFTA, it is
considerably less than meets the eye. Looking at such governance spheres as trans-
border water management or the steel industry shows it to have considerably more
substance than first meets the eye. By contrast, apparently continental policy har-
monization such as the regulation of financial services or intellectual property rights
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is really a manifestation of globalization, while anti-terrorist border security mea-
sures are just what they seem: U.S.-driven inter-governmental policy coordination
in which the hegemon ends up depending on the periphery’s collaboration. Global
market consolidation in the automobile industry suggests that the continent has
lost its chance to become a regional regulatory space. The 2005 Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America may have renewed the three federal governments’
commitment to reconciling the U.S. priority for border security with the periphery’s
need for prosperity but did not give any sign that North America was about to sign
on to any grander institutional project. 
In terms of governance, North America clearly has multiple identities. We can
see what it is not: an embryonic EU destined to develop along the lines of the
European model in which asymmetries diminish and solidarities emerge. The polit-
ical disparities between Mexico and Canada may be diminishing, but in most gov-
ernance dimensions the hegemon is becoming more dominant vis-à-vis its periphery.
When seen in the broader context of global governance trends, the small signs of
trinational governance that have appeared are not enough to have reconstructed
“North America” as a primary regulatory space.
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